Democracy, Freedom and the Equal Distribution of Resources

It would take a far larger work than an essay to analyze the relationship between political and economic systems. This essay is limited to two connected theses regarding that complicated relationship. The first is that democracy is the best political system because it provides more freedom to more people than any other political system. Inherent in this proposition is that freedom is what actually matters. The second is a critique of Robert Dahl’s assessment of the relationship between democracy and free market capitalism. Dahl describes a potential problem existing between free market capitalism and democracy. He explains that the unequal distribution of resources generated by the free market can limit the democratic potential in a nation or system. While this is an important, well argued critique, it is only part of the picture. He does not contend with some inherent implications of his argument. One implication is that, by contrast, an equal distribution of resources would not limit democratic potential. But, in fact, the equal distribution of resources could also limit democratic potential by limiting freedom. In only arguing that an unequal distribution of resources can limit democratic potential, when in fact both an equal and an unequal distribution can potentially do so, Dahl paints a conceptually myopic portrait of the relationship between the free market and democracy. Dahl additionally offers no explanations as to how the unequal distribution of resources might enhance democratic potential by enhancing freedom. Dahl needs to expand his critique so that he does not seem partial about the relationship between the free market and democracy. It would be outside the scope of this essay to provide all concievable answers to these questions; several possibilities are presented.

Democracy is the most worthwhile political system for a nation state. This is because it provides more freedom to more people than any other plausible political system. Democracy and freedom are not synonyms. They are certainly related, but they are distinct concepts. The value of democracy hinges primarily on its capacity to grant freedom, not on any intrinsic virtue. If another system provided more freedom than democracy, that system would be more desirable. Such a political system is difficult to conceive, however. Democracy is likely not only the best currently available, but the best that is plausible.

Robert Dahl, in his book On Democracy asks the question, “why should we believe that democracy is a better way of governing the state than any nondemocratic alternative?” [Dahl 45]. His elegant answer comprises ten points, or “desirable consequences” of democracy -
1. Avoiding tyranny [Dahl 45]
2. Essential rights
3. General freedom
4. Self determination
5. Moral autonomy
6. Human development
7. Protecting essential personal interests
8. Political equality
9. Peace-seeking
10. Prosperity
These features have a common theme. Nearly every consequence is directly related to the concept of freedom. The following is a less specific, general way of expressing each of these same “desirable consequences.”
1. Freedom from oppression
2. Freedom from oppression
3. Freedom
4. Freedom to choose for oneself
5. Freedom of conscience
6. Human development
7. Freedom from oppression
8. Freedom from oppression
9. Freedom from wars
10. Freedom from poverty
The final two points are expressed slightly facetiously. Expressing peace and prosperity as facets of freedom is to conflate the three concepts. They are all three related and interconnected, but it is outside the scope of this paper to explore their relationship. Nevertheless, a people mired in poverty or conflict is hardly freer than a people which is not. Without exploring every qualification, in general it can be assumed that peace and prosperity are types of freedom (or can be reasonably included in a broad definition of it).

In a quick counting, 9 out of 10 of the very reasons democracy is desirable deal directly with freedom. The 6th point, human development, is expressed eloquently in terms related to freedom by Dahl. The potential for human development in a society includes “…the scope within which adults can act to protect their own interests…take responsibility for important decisions, and engage freely with others in a search for the best decision” [Dahl 56]. Apparently Dahl’s explanation for why human development is a desirable trait of democracy is because, like every other consequence of democracy, it provides freedom.

For Dahl, democracy’s capacity to grant freedom is its great virtue. It is therefore quite reasonable to argue that, in sum, the reason democracy is desirable is because it provides more freedom than any other political system.

In dealing with abstracts, rather than practical application, a qualification must be included. A political system (or non-system) which provides an individual with complete freedom to act as he or she wishes is undesirable. Indeed, this system would fail at its fundament, because such a system could only provide complete freedom to a single individual, not everyone. As soon as the first individual to exercise his “complete freedom” to steal another’s car or burn down another’s house, the system has failed by allowing one individual’s “freedom” to impinge on another’s.
What is desirable then, is not the intractible concept of complete freedom for every individual. The question is utilitarian and becomes ‘which system will provide the most freedom for the most individuals?’ Democracy is that system.

Having explained that democracy is the best political system because of its vast freedom-granting potential, Dahl notes that it “has existed only in countries with predominantly market-capitalist economies” [Dahl 166, emphasis in original]. However, he warns, there are reasons as to why free market capitalism does not “favor” democracy [Dahl 173]. He explains that “because of inequalities in political resources [generated by the free market], some citizens gain significantly more influence than others over the government’s policies, decisions and actions” [Dahl 178]. Put in a less theoretical presentation, Dahl is saying that a person or organization such as a lobby with a lot of money (or some other powerful political resources) could buy off or pressure a law-maker or could directly persuade the voters themselves.

Suppose a rich person buys all the newspapers (or some other communications media). That person will naturally have more influence over voters than everybody else who cannot decide what is said in that particular communications media. This appears to limit the democratic potential, as Dahl asserts. The implied solution seems to be that wealth and political resources be distributed evenly among all individuals so that no single person is wealthy enough to own all the newspapers.

It is not so simple. Now imagine a system where all political resources and wealth are distributed evenly. Why could not a group of individuals – with the right to associate freely – combine their personal resources to influence the other voters? What if they combine their resources to purchase all the newspapers which, in the other scenario, were owned by a single individual? This group, composed of people who are otherwise political and economic equals, now have more political resources than a random citizen of the electorate. The unequal distribution of wealth generated by the free market cannot be blamed for this particular inequality of political resources, because the individuals of the organization each have no more wealth than anyone else. Yet the result and the effect on democracy would be the same in either scenario.

For the first scenario, the solution seems to be to distribute wealth evenly so that no single person would have the means to own all the newspapers. For the second, however, how could the combined means of many people to buy all the newspapers be taken away? That is, after all, the current state of all publicly owned media, whether newspapers or otherwise. The most plausible solution is to completely socialize the communications media such that every citizen owns an equal portion. However, if all the people collectively owned the newspapers, we have only created a solution with its own new problem. The newspaper media would become essentially state-controlled (millions of owners could not participate in the functioning of the media, so the state would be the natural director and manager).

State-controlled media, even in an otherwise completely democratic society, would contradict one of the requirements for a democracy. Dahl explains that “alternative sources of information [must] actually exist that are not under the control of the government” for a large-scale democracy to function properly [Dahl 86]. It is extremely easy to find examples of why state-run (or controlled) media is detrimental to freedom and incompatible with democracy, from the former Soviet Union to modern day China.

Then, what is the solution to our problem? There can neither be an inequality of wealth, nor an equality of wealth in which the right to associate freely is protected, nor can there be state-controlled media. The solution would likely be government regulation (anti-trust laws or some other kind of protection) such that neither the rich man nor the group can control all the newspapers (provided that the law does not infringe their right to associate freely). But an analysis of the best solution is outside the scope of this essay. The salient point is that the solution does not inform us on whether we should allow for an inequality of wealth (scenario of the rich man) or an equality of wealth (scenario of the group). In other words, both the free market and a system which grants equality of wealth can experience a limit on democracy – a limit which is identical for practical purposes.

The implication of Dahl’s critique can be carried further. For example, how could it be reasonably enforced that wealth be distributed equally? Assume there exists an economic system in which every person’s income equals every other person, regardless of his or her job or position. This does not ensure an equality of wealth unless everyone spends his or her money the same. If person A chooses to save her money and person B chooses to spend all of it, then person A will end up with more wealth. If laws are enacted to ensure that all income is spent in the same fashion, then the society borders on the creepy, highly undesirable world of Big Brother. Ensuring an equality of political resources can potentially limit freedom, rather than produce freedom. Dahl is silent on this, though he would certainly oppose such laws.

Dahl is equally silent on how an inequality of resources can actually generate or preserve freedom. In contrast to some of the potential limits a full equality of wealth might have on individual freedom, there are ways in which the inequality of wealth can be a boon to freedom. For example, if wealth were distributed evenly, one would have the difficult time of finding agreement between many, many others (as described in the second scenario about the communications media) in order to disseminate knowledge and ideas. This would be a much simpler task in the free market. According to the economist Milton Friedman, “In a capitalist society, it is only necessary to convince a few wealthy people to get funds to launch any idea, however strange, and there are many such persons, many independent foci of support” [Friedman 17]. A man is therefore freer to propagate ideas and to convince others of their soundness. This greater ability to disseminate ideas is an expansion of freedom, not a restriction of it. This potential benefit to freedom, and therefore to the basis for a democratic system, is the obverse of Dahl’s critique that the free market allows some political influences to be stronger than others. Dahl is completely silent on this side of the issue.

There are other ways the unequal distribution of resources relates to freedom, which Dahl fails to mention, or mentions them very indirectly. Three of Dahl’s ten reasons why democracy is the best system, as stated previously, are “protecting essential personal interests,” “self determination” and “human development.” In describing these points, Dahl says “you will surely want to exercise some control over the factors that determine whether and to what extent you can satisfy your wants – some freedom of choice, an opportunity to shape your life in accordance with your own goals” [Dahl 52]. Imagine a person, no matter how determined she is, no matter what lengths she goes to develop her mental capacities and her skills and natural proficiencies, finds that she can never attain an increase in wealth. She is limited by the sum total of wealth, which is distributed perfectly evenly throughout a society. She is less free than someone who, by the fruits of her perseverance, labor and talents, will actually reap the financial consequences of her actions. She is not free to act to “protect [her] own interests” and therefore to experience the “human development” and “self-determination.” that are desirable consequences of democracy [Dahl 56]. Dahl is silent on this aspect of the relationship between protecting one’s personal interests and the unequal distribution of wealth in the free market. Much (though certainly not all) of the inequality of wealth generated by the free market is the result of individual choices, made freely by individuals. Since the consequence of inequality of resources within the free market can be the result of the economic freedom that the free market grants to individuals, to deprive the system of the ability to generate an inequality of resources would be to limit freedom. And freedom is the desirable fruit of democracy.

The relationship between free market capitalism and democracy is complicated. Dahl’s critique can be summed up as ‘while democracy creates political equality, the free market can limit that political equality.’ This is an insufficient representation of the relationship between democracy and the free market, however. Democracy also creates individual freedom, and the free market can help to generate and ensure that individual freedom. The facet of the free market that Dahl specifically says can limit democratic potential – the unequal distribution of resources – is a facet of the free market that can help to preserve freedom. Yet Dahl presents only one side of this particular issue. Regarding the unequal distribution of resources, he exclusively explains that it is detrimental to democracy. If democracy really is all about freedom, as Dahl argues in the first place, then he should expand his critique of the free market to include how it can also protect that freedom.
 
Works Cited
Dahl, Robert A. On Democracy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.
Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.